Housing market • House prices • Rental • Taxas

HOW POLITICAL INCAPACITY PERPETUATES THE HOUSING CRISIS

 

During the second quarter of this year, on May 20 to be precise, Decree-Law No. 97/2026 was published in the Diário da República, Portugal's official gazette.
Approved by the Government under an authorization from the Assembleia da República (the Portuguese Parliament), the law creates, among other measures, a tax break for building homes sold at a "moderate sale price," with a ceiling, applicable across the entire country, of €660,000.

As it happens, from the data published by Statistics Portugal (INE), we know that the average sale price of a new home in Portugal in that same quarter was €330,000 (INE publishes the total value and the number of transactions; divide one by the other and you get the national average).

In other words: because homes are expensive and so many Portuguese people struggle to buy one, Parliament authorized a tax incentive that encourages building homes, all across the country, at up to twice the average price of new homes in Portugal (which, unless I am mistaken, we all already considered expensive).

 

Website of the Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (AT), the Portuguese Tax and Customs Authority.

By Vitor Miranda.

SHOTS IN THE DARK

On September 25, 2025, following a Council of Ministers meeting, the Prime Minister held a press conference at his official residence, alongside the Minister of Infrastructure and Housing. In that announcement, the two officials unveiled, among other things, a cut in VAT on construction from 23% to 6% for homes sold for up to €648,000, and a personal income tax (IRS) rate of just 10% for landlords charging rents of up to €2,300.

The backdrop to these measures is the steady, sharp rise in housing costs, and the inability of a large share of the population to keep up with it.
Instead of doing the obvious – defining what "moderate" means based on actual market prices – the Government took its cue from the IMT (property transfer tax) bracket table, which since August 2024 has set the ceilings for the full and partial exemption granted to young people up to age 35 (and which is updated every year, which is why the €648,000 cap of 2025 became €660,000 in 2026).

What the Government apparently failed to notice is that, three days before its press conference, INE had published the House Price Index for the second quarter of 2025, with the number and value of transactions for the country and for different regions.

Had it consulted the report, it would have seen that the average sale price of a new home in Portugal that quarter was €317,000. And perhaps it would not have proposed, for the whole country and for every home type, a ceiling more than twice that amount.

 

BUT FIRST, LET'S TALK ABOUT RENTALS

When the Government made this announcement, the political opposition and the media focused on the view that €2,300 was far too high to be called a moderate rent, and on the idea that lowering the tax on rental income up to that amount would push rents below €2,300 up toward that figure.

Asking whether €2,300 is too high to be called moderate is an entirely legitimate exercise. And given that the cap applies indiscriminately to the whole country, it is also an extremely relevant one.

But suggesting that a supply-side stimulus (the one who directly receives the benefit is the landlord) will – per se – make rentals more expensive calls, in my view, for a robust explanation that I do not recall anyone ever offering.

It seems reasonable to assume that the people who would pay rents above €2,300 and up to €2,700 may be the ones who benefit most directly from this mechanism: the landlords of those homes may find it worthwhile to lower the rent to €2,300, the maximum eligible for the benefit.
Just to be completely clear: a €2,300 rent taxed at 10% leaves the landlord with €2,070 net, more than a €2,700 rent taxed at the standard 25% rate (€2,025).It is true that some landlords (namely, those who signed five-year leases) already enjoyed a 15% rate. For them, the cut to 10% can also justify lowering the rent to €2,300, but the band in which that happens is narrower: up to just over €2,400.

But just as relevant as asking whether this is the segment of the population we should be most trying to help (those who can afford more than €2,300 in rent), if not more so, is questioning the idea, repeated so often by the Government, that there is no downside to setting a very high ceiling for the country as a whole.

According to the newspaper Observador, the Minister of Infrastructure and Housing is adamant: "It is a tax ceiling, not a social label. Only those who don't want to understand don't get it."

 

Sé de Braga (Braga Cathedral).

By Juan Gomez.

THE LISBON YARDSTICK AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY

In Braga, according to the latest local Housing Rent Statistics report, published on September 29 of this year, the median value per square meter of new lease agreements is half that of the same indicator in Lisbon (€8.68/m² vs. €17.43/m²).

At the very moment I write these lines (October 26, 2026), there are 432 listings for apartments to rent on the Idealista portal in the municipality of Braga. Of these 432, only six are priced at €2,300 or more. I repeat: six. In other words, the ceiling the Government chose for a moderate rent sits, in this sample, at around the 99th percentile. Only near that top end can the ceiling create a direct incentive to lower rents.

Without wishing to downplay the possible impact of the tax incentive as a whole (since the tax cut also benefited landlords charging rents up to €2,300, and the Government could argue that this brought more homes onto the market), what incentive did landlords of homes at a "moderate monthly rent" have to lower the price? None.

Bearing in mind that the median value per square meter of new rents is half the figure recorded in Lisbon... what impact could the Government's measure have had if the ceiling for the tax break in Braga had been €1,150?


In the same Idealista search, there were 95 listings between €1,150 and €1,350, a price range in which – assuming a €1,150 cap for the tax break – landlords would have a direct incentive to lower the rent to that amount (that is: a €1,150 rent taxed at 10% yields more net income than a €1,200 or €1,300 rent taxed at 25%, assuming no reduced rates for leases of five years or longer).

On this subject, in an interview with the newspaper ECO, Miguel Pinto Luz, Minister of Infrastructure and Housing, makes a surprising statement.

The minister says (about the €2,300 ceiling applied to the whole country):

"(...) it is a measure with a positive externality, one of territorial fairness: it makes territories that were not competitive today competitive again. So it has that dimension."

What territorial fairness is the minister talking about?
Based on this sample, in Braga the €2,300 ceiling cannot create an incentive aimed at lowering (truly) moderate rents: the landlords of those properties benefit from the tax cut even if they keep charging their tenants exactly the same.

Let me stress that I am not taking the liberty of defining what is moderate.
My observation accepts what members of the Government have repeated countless times: that €2,300 is a moderate rent in Lisbon.
The only thing that sets my approach apart from the executive's is that I did not ignore the data published by the public institute whose mission is "to produce, in an independent manner, high-quality official statistical information, relevant for the society". And that data is unequivocal about the ratio between median rents per square meter in Lisbon and in Braga.

It is worth noting that the Technical Budget Support Unit (UTAO) had already warned that only 0.9% of residential lease agreements subject to the flat-rate tax had rents above €2,300, and that the ceiling was set nationally, with no regard for regional differences. The same analysis estimated that more than three quarters of the IRS revenue lost through this measure (around €217 million of €279 million) would relate to leases with rents of up to €1,000. In other words, to landlords who now pay less tax without the measure giving them any direct incentive to lower the rent.

It is absurd to concentrate the direct incentive to lower rents at the top of the distribution. And it shows that the Government's concept of a moderate monthly rent lacks any criterion whatsoever.

But what is perhaps more serious is that the Government may not have realized that, by applying the Lisbon yardstick to the entire country, it is wasting the opportunity – nationwide – to encourage landlords of homes with (truly) moderate rents to lower what they charge their tenants each month.


And let me remind you that, out of Portugal's 308 municipalities, there are surely more than two hundred where housing costs are lower than in Braga. And that the Government saw fit to apply to every one of them the same €2,300 "moderate monthly rent" ceiling and the same €660,000 "moderate sale price."

All that said, although €2,300 is also the benchmark for the VAT cut on construction intended for rental, the impact of the moderate monthly rent falls mainly on the existing housing stock. It is true that an opportunity to give the tax incentive real meaning is being missed. But, however disappointing this may seem, the effects of this distorted view of moderate rents are more limited in time.

When it comes to applying the tax break to construction for sale, choices made without criteria may actually worsen housing problems in the long run.
Because this is not just about setting the price of supply. Here, the opportunity to (re)define supply itself may also be wasted.

 

Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro.

By Alexandros Michailidis.

THE GOVERNMENT HASN'T GRASPED THE OPPORTUNITY IT IS WASTING

The flawed definition of "moderate sale price" may have deeper consequences than in the rental market, because developers have a power that landlords do not.
These entrepreneurs do not just decide what prices the homes yet to be built will be listed at. It is also up to them to decide what those homes will be.

What should be at stake is granting a tax break to those who determine what new housing supply exists, if (and only if) that choice serves the goals the Government itself set out in the preamble of the decree-law.

The aim is to reduce the developer's costs, so that the equation underpinning the business plan makes it viable to build homes at prices compatible with the incomes of most of the population across the country's different regions.

If a developer believes there is demand for €600,000 homes and that, given the project's costs and risks, that segment offers a better deal than building homes to sell at €500,000 or €400,000, it is to be expected that they will stick with that choice.
There is nothing surprising about that decision. The problem is that, with a €660,000 ceiling, they may well benefit from the tax incentive without being required to build cheaper homes. The State thus risks supporting a choice the developer would have made anyway, when it could use that support to make building lower-priced homes more attractive, which is precisely what these measures are meant to achieve.

What is required of the State is that it think, with clear criteria, about how to motivate developers to build homes in the price segment the country needs most. And it is deeply surprising that members of the Government and the members of Parliament still need to be reminded that those homes should not cost €600,000.

What good is a law that grants tax breaks to a developer who sells, for €500,000 or €600,000, a one-bedroom (T1) in Oeiras or a three-bedroom (T3) in Aveiro? That is a price segment the industry is already catering to.

Once again, there will be no shortage of Government members saying "that's just the ceiling; nothing prevents homes from being built below that price." But that argument does not hold in this context.

A ceiling only has an effect if it is actually restrictive. And that is very hard to achieve when the cap is twice the average price of new homes sold in the country. For an incentive to have the intended effect, it must shape the choices of those who receive it.

In fact, Público had already made a significant contribution to the debate (republished by ECO with free access), showing that, for a home of average size, there is not a single municipality in the country, not even Lisbon or Cascais, where the median sale price exceeds the "moderate price" set by the Government.

So what real incentive to build cheaper homes can such a high ceiling possibly create?
A developer who today sells a two-bedroom (T2) for €450,000 in Espinho (a price in line with some current new-build listings in the municipality) gets no specific incentive from this tax break to lower prices. On the contrary: since the State guarantees them the same tax advantage up to €660,000, if they sense demand in a higher segment, they may even develop a product to sell at higher prices. And yet the goal was exactly the opposite: to encourage them to build cheaper homes.

They could also choose to build in Guimarães, where – according to the latest local Housing Price Statistics report, published on October 23 of this year – the median value per square meter (€1,859/m²) is about a third lower than in Espinho (€2,797/m²), and offer, for the same price, a higher-end product than the one they offered in Espinho. In none of these scenarios does the new legal framework seem to encourage the developer to build cheaper homes.

Let's try to get a sense of scale. As a purely illustrative exercise, let's assume that the price per square meter of new construction is 30% higher than the median price per square meter of all homes sold in each municipality [for reference, INE's House Price Index data shows that, in the North region (NUTS II), the average transaction value of new homes in the second quarter of 2026 was about 15% higher than that of all homes sold; however, that is a value per home, not per square meter]. On that assumption, €500,000 – about three quarters of the €660,000 ceiling – would buy about 207 m² in Guimarães and 138 m² in Espinho.

Two notes:

  1. In this exercise, the higher the premium assumed for new construction, the smaller the resulting floor areas.
  2. Espinho is not a cheap municipality: according to the same statistics, its median value per square meter is the third highest in the Porto Metropolitan Area and is even higher than that of some municipalities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area.
     

Given that, in Portugal, the average household has 2.4 people, it seems reasonable to me to say that the homes the country needs most will, on average, be smaller than those in these examples. And therefore cheaper.

That said, the shrinking average household size can also be used by developers when dealing with municipalities (in their shoes, I would do exactly that) to make the case for projects with smaller unit types and thus take full advantage of the fact that the “moderate sale price” ceiling is the same for a studio (T0) or a four-bedroom (T4): after all, a 60 or 70 m² one-bedroom (T1) in Lisbon or Cascais, sold for €650,000, meets the price criterion to benefit from the tax incentive.

I believe this makes clearer why I argue that the ceilings set by the Government undermine what the decree-law itself sets out to do, and why I believe these measures will encourage the construction of homes that most families cannot afford.

With this design, by cutting taxes, the State risks subsidizing gated communities with swimming pools in Guimarães and other cities, at prices that could only be described as "moderate" in more expensive municipalities. It thus gives up the condition that gives the incentive its meaning – a price cap that genuinely forces homes to be sold for less – and wastes the opportunity to produce homes that most of the resident population can afford. I have absolutely nothing against homes with pools; in fact, I intend to live in one. I just don't think it's the State's job to subsidize that wish of mine.

Either the Government is not telling the truth when, in the preamble of the decree-law, it speaks of the need for "creating a housing stock suited to the housing needs of the population in the different areas of the national territory"… or, in this particular chapter (because it is true that the law also includes positive initiatives), it does not understand the consequences of its choices.
I believe the second. And that is why I am writing this piece.

What is at stake is not a mechanism to artificially lower home prices, but the design of an incentive capable of making business plans viable, so that developers commit to building homes different from those the market invites them to produce.

We are talking about building homes for people with less money than those for whom most homes have been built. They will probably be homes with less generous floor areas, a lower bathroom-to-bedroom ratio, or more spartan finishes.

The point is not so much to fight for the Portuguese to have better housing standards in 2027 than in 2007. That fight – in the face of a price surge that wage growth does not come close to matching – seems lost.

It is important to keep in mind that the unaffordability of housing has fostered the emergence of business models based on exploiting housing scarcity. In recent years we have seen housing solutions that represent a striking step backward in people's living conditions. I am thinking, for example, of storage rooms and garages being used as homes, or of overcrowding and the extreme subdivision of space, which I have already had the opportunity to describe in this article.

I admit it may seem a long journey from homes costing up to €660,000 to a room shared by four strangers. But these examples are, to a large extent, the last link in a chain. When the middle class can no longer afford the supply that would be meant for them, they move down to the segment just below, competing for those homes with the people already there and, in turn, pushing those people further down. At the end of the chain, for those with the least, what is left is the garage, the storage room or a bed in an overcrowded room. Or, in the most dramatic cases, the street. The current Government is obviously not to blame for these phenomena. But, with this decree-law, it now bears political responsibility for decisions that help perpetuate them.

It is true that whoever buys a new €600,000 home will tend to leave the home they lived in, which will then become available to another family. But that effect is slow and uncertain, and does not justify the State giving up tax revenue without this translating into direct support for the segment where the housing shortage is most acute.

However little this may serve the short-term political marketing goals of government and opposition alike, we must realize that what we have in our hands with the "moderate sale price" is the opportunity to help shape the housing stock we may have in 2032 or 2037.

 

Aerial view of Algés (Oeiras).

By Martina.

THE HOMES THE COUNTRY NEEDS

Cutting VAT on construction from 23% to 6% can help get cheaper homes built. Not because prices will miraculously start to fall. But because a tax break can make viable a home in a lower segment than the one that, without the incentive, would likely be built in its place.

And in this way, by changing the composition of supply (building more mid-market homes where, without incentives, homes for the upper-middle segment would tend to "spring up"), new construction can be expected to contribute less to the price surge.

We can also consider whether, in a scenario where construction accounts for about two thirds of a project's total investment, a 17-percentage-point cut in VAT could mean savings of close to 10% of that investment. Savings the developer could pass on, fully or partly, to the final price paid by whoever will live in the home.

But that view has two limitations.
The first is obvious. Nothing guarantees that the tax break granted to the developer will not be absorbed by them and/or by whoever sells them the land (which is, in a way, a repeat of what we saw in the rental market). That is a real risk, and it is exactly what, according to Público, two expert opinions commissioned by Parliament suggest (one signed by Luís Clemente-Casinhas and Sofia Vale, professors at ISCTE; the other by Paulo Rodrigues, an economist at Banco de Portugal).
The second limitation invites reflection. Even assuming the benefit granted to the developer is passed on, fully or partly, to the final buyer, is what the country most urgently needs really €600,000 homes sold for €550,000?
I don't think so.


I think Portugal needs homes at €200,000, €300,000 and €400,000.
And no, I'm not living in a fantasy world.


If members of Parliament ran a few searches for new builds on Idealista, they would find that, in the municipality of Sintra, there are new projects with two-bedroom (T2) apartments between €360,000 and €380,000.
And that in the municipality of Vila Nova de Gaia, more than one development is advertising one- and two-bedroom (T1 and T2) apartments below €200,000 and €300,000, respectively.

They are not in the historic center of Sintra or downtown Gaia, nor do they offer head-on views of Pena Palace or the Dom Luís Bridge, but they are housing options, in October 2026, in the country's second and third most populous municipalities, at prices at which a good part of the population can at least consider buying a home.

In 2024, in Leça da Palmeira, a development was launched with 31 m² studios (T0) for under €100,000 and 98 m² three-bedroom (T3) apartments for just over €300,000. As of today, the developer's website still lists a 3-bedroom apartment with a rectangular floor plan, one en-suite bedroom and a parking space for sale at €335,000. In other words, an apartment of almost 100 m² in an area far more expensive than most of the country, priced very close to the average sale price of a newly built home.

Leça da Palmeira is a coastal area of the municipality of Matosinhos which, according to INE data, out of 308 municipalities, is among the 10 most populous in the country and among the 20 with the highest median value per square meter. We are not talking about a remote area of the interior. Matosinhos is the third most populous municipality in the Porto Metropolitan Area and the second most expensive, surpassed only by Porto itself (and ahead of Espinho, which we discussed earlier).

Most of these apartments have no heating, built-in closets, oven, refrigerator, washing machine or dishwasher. But this developer figured (and rightly so, it seems: only 3 of 102 units remain available) that some people could do without these items to save some money when buying a new home.

I am sure the prices in these developments were only possible thanks to a set of conditions that do not always come together. But that is exactly what the tax break should exist for: to make possible projects that would hardly be viable under current market conditions.

 

Website of Statistics Portugal (INE).

By Timon.

AN EQUAL CAP FOR AN UNEQUAL COUNTRY

The problem with this decree-law is not just the figure chosen. It is also the fact that there is only one. Having the same cap for a studio (T0) and a four-bedroom (T4) is hard to understand. I accept that a single cap may make it easier to apply the tax incentive across the board in a single condominium building. But I do not believe ease of application is enough, on its own, to justify that choice. Much less does it justify applying the same cap to the entire country. A home in Cascais does not cost the same as a home in Bragança: the median value per square meter in Cascais is four times that of Bragança.

Even if the cap had been set at the average sale price of new homes in Portugal (€330,000), it would still be excessive in much of the country and probably insufficient where homes are most expensive. A cap based on clear criteria would have to vary according to the actual transaction prices INE publishes, as I believe the Braga rental example clearly showed (and as I believe will become clear again shortly).

Please note the average sale price of a new home in Greater Lisbon, the country's most expensive region, in the second quarter of 2026: €584,000.
All nine of its municipalities (Lisbon, Cascais, Oeiras, Odivelas, Loures, Amadora, Sintra, Mafra and Vila Franca de Xira, in descending order of housing prices) are in the top 25 most expensive municipalities in Portugal (out of 308).
The first five are in the top 10 most expensive, and the first three are in fact the three most expensive municipalities in the entire country.

And yet, knowing that in an area made up of the most expensive municipalities in the country the average sale price of a new home is €584,000, it has been decided that €660,000 is a moderate price in Bragança.
Where, as the reader already knows, the median value per square meter is a quarter of that recorded in Cascais.

Think Bragança is a cherry-picked example?
It isn't.

There are three district capitals where prices are lower.

Think Bragança is too remote an example?
Then let's talk about Santarém, whose train station is served by Intercidades and Alfa Pendular trains that take about half an hour to reach Lisbon's Oriente station.

The median value per square meter in Cascais is 3.1 times that of Santarém.

Now you think Cascais is the cherry-picked example?

Then let's talk about Sintra, where the median value per square meter is 1.9 times that of Santarém.

What is being asked of the Government is the most basic common sense. In truth, that is essentially all that is being asked of it: common sense.

Having different caps for geographic areas with (so) different housing costs is nothing new. Back in 2019, an annex to Ordinance No. 176/2019 sorted the country's 308 municipalities into six brackets for the Affordable Rental Program.
But what is most surprising is that, in the very decree-law in which the Government created the definitions of "moderate monthly rent" and "moderate sale price," it also introduced the "Simplified Affordable Rental Regime," whose caps, set by Ordinance No. 454/2026/1, were published on October 13.

For affordable rentals, the Government defined 144 distinct sets of rent caps for the 308 municipalities and the different home types, based, according to the ordinance itself, on the median rents INE publishes for each municipality. You read that right: 144.
For the "moderate monthly rent" and the "moderate sale price," neither INE's data nor the possible range of home types mattered. A single cap was set for each: €2,300 and €660,000, for the whole country and for any home type.

No one is asking the Government to replicate, for new-home sales and the free rental market, the 144 sets of caps used for affordable rentals. It would be enough to do something similar to what was done in 2019: group all municipalities into a few brackets based on the prices INE publishes and, ideally, set caps by home type within each bracket.

 

FINAL THOUGHTS

The Government still seems not to have understood that, with this decree-law, we risk spending the next few years encouraging the construction of homes in a price segment the industry is already catering to organically. And this is happening at a time when the country urgently needs a stimulus to build more affordably.
When those who build for higher segments are rewarded in the same way as those who build for lower ones, no one can claim there is an incentive to build cheap homes rather than more expensive ones. Because it isn't true.

I am one of the people who benefits most from the lack of criteria in applying the tax break. As a real estate agent, my income doubles when, instead of a €330,000 home, I sell one for €660,000. That said, I am sure there will be no shortage of people in a situation similar to mine who – even in the legitimate exercise of their roles in industry associations – will express to the Government views entirely contrary to those I defend in this article.
It will be up to the media to judge when the interests of an association, a profession or an industry coincide with the public interest.

The Minister of State and Finance and the Minister of Infrastructure and Housing cannot be expected to be experts in the residential market and its mechanisms. But a government is not made up only of a prime minister, 16 ministers and 43 secretaries of state. There are hundreds of people, including chiefs of staff, advisers, technical specialists, personal secretaries and a whole universe of technical support staff.
And it is hard to accept that, among so many professionals (plus countless experts they are free to consult), there appears to have been no serious discussion about the best way to set the price caps for a tax break whose purpose is to encourage the construction of homes most of the population can afford.


After attending, on January 9, the general debate on the bill in the plenary of the Assembleia da República, I was left with exactly the same impression: most members of Parliament do not master the subject and confine themselves to speeches in line with their party's position.

Following that debate, on February 10 I published the article "How moderate is a rent of up to €2,300 and a price of up to €660,982?" and sent it to the Committee on Budget, Finance and Public Administration, where the bill was being examined in detail.

Contrary to what many people suggest, the housing affordability crisis does not have one or two causes, nor one or two solutions.

And the bill the Government managed to get through Parliament has the merit of acting on several fronts.

This Government understood, and in my opinion rightly so, that instead of banning or restricting, its role was to encourage. But a government whose mantra is that the fight against the housing affordability crisis is won on the supply side... had an obligation to understand what kind of supply the country needs most.

With a single upper cap for the whole country, the necessary commitments cannot be secured from the direct beneficiaries of the tax incentive: the developers, who are the ones who will shape the country's housing supply.
Because, more than "more homes," Portugal needs "more homes that most Portuguese people can afford."

 

The definition of a moderate price is far too important to risk throwing (almost) everything away with a decision that, in light of the data, is utterly incomprehensible. And my objection has nothing to do with semantics. I have nothing against the word "moderate." But I have a great deal against calling moderate figures that, across almost the entire country, show not the slightest moderation.

Either the Government acts in line with the words it chooses, or it will end up helping to perpetuate the housing affordability crisis.

 

 

 

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